gss_ctx_id_t

typedef struct gss_ctx_id_struct *gss_ctx_id_t;

gss_cred_id_t

typedef struct gss_cred_id_struct *gss_cred_id_t;

gss_name_t

typedef struct gss_name_struct *gss_name_t;

gss_uint32

OM_uint32

typedef gss_uint32 OM_uint32;

gss_qop_t

typedef OM_uint32 gss_qop_t;

gss_cred_usage_t

typedef int gss_cred_usage_t;

GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG

#define GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG      1

GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG

#define GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG     2

GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG

#define GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG     4

GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG

#define GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG   8

GSS_C_CONF_FLAG

#define GSS_C_CONF_FLAG       16

GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG

#define GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG      32

GSS_C_ANON_FLAG

#define GSS_C_ANON_FLAG       64

GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG

#define GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG 128

GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG

#define GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG      256

GSS_C_BOTH

#define GSS_C_BOTH     0

GSS_C_INITIATE

#define GSS_C_INITIATE 1

GSS_C_ACCEPT

#define GSS_C_ACCEPT   2

GSS_C_GSS_CODE

#define GSS_C_GSS_CODE  1

GSS_C_MECH_CODE

#define GSS_C_MECH_CODE 2

GSS_C_AF_UNSPEC

#define GSS_C_AF_UNSPEC     0

GSS_C_AF_LOCAL

#define GSS_C_AF_LOCAL      1

GSS_C_AF_INET

#define GSS_C_AF_INET       2

GSS_C_AF_IMPLINK

#define GSS_C_AF_IMPLINK    3

GSS_C_AF_PUP

#define GSS_C_AF_PUP        4

GSS_C_AF_CHAOS

#define GSS_C_AF_CHAOS      5

GSS_C_AF_NS

#define GSS_C_AF_NS         6

GSS_C_AF_NBS

#define GSS_C_AF_NBS        7

GSS_C_AF_ECMA

#define GSS_C_AF_ECMA       8

GSS_C_AF_DATAKIT

#define GSS_C_AF_DATAKIT    9

GSS_C_AF_CCITT

#define GSS_C_AF_CCITT      10

GSS_C_AF_SNA

#define GSS_C_AF_SNA        11

GSS_C_AF_DECnet

#define GSS_C_AF_DECnet     12

GSS_C_AF_DLI

#define GSS_C_AF_DLI        13

GSS_C_AF_LAT

#define GSS_C_AF_LAT        14

GSS_C_AF_HYLINK

#define GSS_C_AF_HYLINK     15

GSS_C_AF_APPLETALK

#define GSS_C_AF_APPLETALK  16

GSS_C_AF_BSC

#define GSS_C_AF_BSC        17

GSS_C_AF_DSS

#define GSS_C_AF_DSS        18

GSS_C_AF_OSI

#define GSS_C_AF_OSI        19

GSS_C_AF_X25

#define GSS_C_AF_X25        21

GSS_C_AF_NULLADDR

#define GSS_C_AF_NULLADDR   255

GSS_C_NO_NAME

#define GSS_C_NO_NAME ((gss_name_t) 0)

GSS_C_NO_BUFFER

#define GSS_C_NO_BUFFER ((gss_buffer_t) 0)

GSS_C_NO_OID

#define GSS_C_NO_OID ((gss_OID) 0)

GSS_C_NO_OID_SET

#define GSS_C_NO_OID_SET ((gss_OID_set) 0)

GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT

#define GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT ((gss_ctx_id_t) 0)

GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL

#define GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL ((gss_cred_id_t) 0)

GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS

#define GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS ((gss_channel_bindings_t) 0)

GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER

#define GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER {0, NULL}

GSS_C_NULL_OID

#define GSS_C_NULL_OID GSS_C_NO_OID

GSS_C_NULL_OID_SET

#define GSS_C_NULL_OID_SET GSS_C_NO_OID_SET

GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT

#define GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT 0

GSS_C_INDEFINITE

#define GSS_C_INDEFINITE 0xfffffffful

GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME

extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME;

GSS_C_NT_MACHINE_UID_NAME

extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_MACHINE_UID_NAME;

GSS_C_NT_STRING_UID_NAME

extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_STRING_UID_NAME;

GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE_X

extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE_X;

GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE

extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE;

GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS

extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS;

GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME

extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME;

GSS_S_COMPLETE

#define GSS_S_COMPLETE 0

GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET

#define GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET 24

GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET

#define GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET 16

GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET

#define GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET 0

GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_MASK

#define GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_MASK 0377ul

GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_MASK

#define GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_MASK 0377ul

GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_MASK

#define GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_MASK 0177777ul

GSS_CALLING_ERROR()

#define     GSS_CALLING_ERROR(x)

GSS_ROUTINE_ERROR()

#define     GSS_ROUTINE_ERROR(x)

GSS_SUPPLEMENTARY_INFO()

#define     GSS_SUPPLEMENTARY_INFO(x)

GSS_ERROR()

#define     GSS_ERROR(x)

GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ

#define GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ	(1ul << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET)

GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE

#define GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE	(2ul << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET)

GSS_S_CALL_BAD_STRUCTURE

#define GSS_S_CALL_BAD_STRUCTURE	(3ul << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET)

GSS_S_BAD_MECH

#define GSS_S_BAD_MECH             (1ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)

GSS_S_BAD_NAME

#define GSS_S_BAD_NAME             (2ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)

GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE

#define GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE         (3ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)

GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS

#define GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS         (4ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)

GSS_S_BAD_STATUS

#define GSS_S_BAD_STATUS           (5ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)

GSS_S_BAD_SIG

#define GSS_S_BAD_SIG              (6ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)

GSS_S_BAD_MIC

#define GSS_S_BAD_MIC GSS_S_BAD_SIG

GSS_S_NO_CRED

#define GSS_S_NO_CRED              (7ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)

GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT

#define GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT           (8ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)

GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN

#define GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN      (9ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)

GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL

#define GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL (10ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)

GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED

#define GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED  (11ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)

GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED

#define GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED      (12ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)

GSS_S_FAILURE

#define GSS_S_FAILURE              (13ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)

GSS_S_BAD_QOP

#define GSS_S_BAD_QOP              (14ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)

GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED

#define GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED         (15ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)

GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE

#define GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE          (16ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)

GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT

#define GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT    (17ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)

GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN

#define GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN          (18ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)

GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED

#define GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED	(1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 0))

GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN

#define GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN	(1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 1))

GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN

#define GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN		(1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 2))

GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN

#define GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN	(1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 3))

GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN

#define GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN		(1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 4))

gss_acquire_cred ()

OM_uint32   gss_acquire_cred                (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             const gss_name_t desired_name,
                                             OM_uint32 time_req,
                                             const gss_OID_set desired_mechs,
                                             gss_cred_usage_t cred_usage,
                                             gss_cred_id_t *output_cred_handle,
                                             gss_OID_set *actual_mechs,
                                             OM_uint32 *time_rec);

Allows an application to acquire a handle for a pre-existing credential by name. GSS-API implementations must impose a local access-control policy on callers of this routine to prevent unauthorized callers from acquiring credentials to which they are not entitled. This routine is not intended to provide a "login to the network" function, as such a function would involve the creation of new credentials rather than merely acquiring a handle to existing credentials. Such functions, if required, should be defined in implementation-specific extensions to the API.

If desired_name is GSS_C_NO_NAME, the call is interpreted as a request for a credential handle that will invoke default behavior when passed to gss_init_sec_context() (if cred_usage is GSS_C_INITIATE or GSS_C_BOTH) or gss_accept_sec_context() (if cred_usage is GSS_C_ACCEPT or GSS_C_BOTH).

Mechanisms should honor the desired_mechs parameter, and return a credential that is suitable to use only with the requested mechanisms. An exception to this is the case where one underlying credential element can be shared by multiple mechanisms; in this case it is permissible for an implementation to indicate all mechanisms with which the credential element may be used. If desired_mechs is an empty set, behavior is undefined.

This routine is expected to be used primarily by context acceptors, since implementations are likely to provide mechanism-specific ways of obtaining GSS-API initiator credentials from the system login process. Some implementations may therefore not support the acquisition of GSS_C_INITIATE or GSS_C_BOTH credentials via gss_acquire_cred for any name other than GSS_C_NO_NAME, or a name produced by applying either gss_inquire_cred to a valid credential, or gss_inquire_context to an active context.

If credential acquisition is time-consuming for a mechanism, the mechanism may choose to delay the actual acquisition until the credential is required (e.g. by gss_init_sec_context or gss_accept_sec_context). Such mechanism-specific implementation decisions should be invisible to the calling application; thus a call of gss_inquire_cred immediately following the call of gss_acquire_cred must return valid credential data, and may therefore incur the overhead of a deferred credential acquisition.

gss_release_cred ()

OM_uint32   gss_release_cred                (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             gss_cred_id_t *cred_handle);

Informs GSS-API that the specified credential handle is no longer required by the application, and frees associated resources. The cred_handle is set to GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL on successful completion of this call.

gss_init_sec_context ()

OM_uint32   gss_init_sec_context            (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             const gss_cred_id_t initiator_cred_handle,
                                             gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
                                             const gss_name_t target_name,
                                             const gss_OID mech_type,
                                             OM_uint32 req_flags,
                                             OM_uint32 time_req,
                                             const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
                                             const gss_buffer_t input_token,
                                             gss_OID *actual_mech_type,
                                             gss_buffer_t output_token,
                                             OM_uint32 *ret_flags,
                                             OM_uint32 *time_rec);

Initiates the establishment of a security context between the application and a remote peer. Initially, the input_token parameter should be specified either as GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, or as a pointer to a gss_buffer_desc object whose length field contains the value zero. The routine may return a output_token which should be transferred to the peer application, where the peer application will present it to gss_accept_sec_context. If no token need be sent, gss_init_sec_context will indicate this by setting the length field of the output_token argument to zero. To complete the context establishment, one or more reply tokens may be required from the peer application; if so, gss_init_sec_context will return a status containing the supplementary information bit GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED. In this case, gss_init_sec_context should be called again when the reply token is received from the peer application, passing the reply token to gss_init_sec_context via the input_token parameters.

Portable applications should be constructed to use the token length and return status to determine whether a token needs to be sent or waited for. Thus a typical portable caller should always invoke gss_init_sec_context within a loop:

--------------------------------------------------- int context_established = 0; gss_ctx_id_t context_hdl = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; ... input_token->length = 0;

while (!context_established) { maj_stat = gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat, cred_hdl, &context_hdl, target_name, desired_mech, desired_services, desired_time, input_bindings, input_token, &actual_mech, output_token, &actual_services, &actual_time); if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) { report_error(maj_stat, min_stat); };

if (output_token->length != 0) { send_token_to_peer(output_token); gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, output_token) }; if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {

if (context_hdl != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, &context_hdl, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); break; };

if (maj_stat & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { receive_token_from_peer(input_token); } else { context_established = 1; }; }; ---------------------------------------------------

Whenever the routine returns a major status that includes the value GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, the context is not fully established and the following restrictions apply to the output parameters:

- The value returned via the time_rec parameter is undefined unless the accompanying ret_flags parameter contains the bit GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG, indicating that per-message services may be applied in advance of a successful completion status, the value returned via the actual_mech_type parameter is undefined until the routine returns a major status value of GSS_S_COMPLETE.

- The values of the GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG, GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG, GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG, GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG, GSS_C_CONF_FLAG, GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG and GSS_C_ANON_FLAG bits returned via the ret_flags parameter should contain the values that the implementation expects would be valid if context establishment were to succeed. In particular, if the application has requested a service such as delegation or anonymous authentication via the req_flags argument, and such a service is unavailable from the underlying mechanism, gss_init_sec_context should generate a token that will not provide the service, and indicate via the ret_flags argument that the service will not be supported. The application may choose to abort the context establishment by calling gss_delete_sec_context (if it cannot continue in the absence of the service), or it may choose to transmit the token and continue context establishment (if the service was merely desired but not mandatory).

- The values of the GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG and GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG bits within ret_flags should indicate the actual state at the time gss_init_sec_context returns, whether or not the context is fully established.

- GSS-API implementations that support per-message protection are encouraged to set the GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG in the final ret_flags returned to a caller (i.e. when accompanied by a GSS_S_COMPLETE status code). However, applications should not rely on this behavior as the flag was not defined in Version 1 of the GSS-API. Instead, applications should determine what per-message services are available after a successful context establishment according to the GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG and GSS_C_CONF_FLAG values.

- All other bits within the ret_flags argument should be set to zero.

If the initial call of gss_init_sec_context() fails, the implementation should not create a context object, and should leave the value of the context_handle parameter set to GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT to indicate this. In the event of a failure on a subsequent call, the implementation is permitted to delete the "half-built" security context (in which case it should set the context_handle parameter to GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT), but the preferred behavior is to leave the security context untouched for the application to delete (using gss_delete_sec_context).

During context establishment, the informational status bits GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN and GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN indicate fatal errors, and GSS-API mechanisms should always return them in association with a routine error of GSS_S_FAILURE. This requirement for pairing did not exist in version 1 of the GSS-API specification, so applications that wish to run over version 1 implementations must special-case these codes.

The `req_flags` values:

`GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG`:: - True - Delegate credentials to remote peer. - False - Don't delegate.

`GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG`:: - True - Request that remote peer authenticate itself. - False - Authenticate self to remote peer only.

`GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG`:: - True - Enable replay detection for messages protected with gss_wrap or gss_get_mic. - False - Don't attempt to detect replayed messages.

`GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG`:: - True - Enable detection of out-of-sequence protected messages. - False - Don't attempt to detect out-of-sequence messages.

`GSS_C_CONF_FLAG`:: - True - Request that confidentiality service be made available (via gss_wrap). - False - No per-message confidentiality service is required.

`GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG`:: - True - Request that integrity service be made available (via gss_wrap or gss_get_mic). - False - No per-message integrity service is required.

`GSS_C_ANON_FLAG`:: - True - Do not reveal the initiator's identity to the acceptor. - False - Authenticate normally.

The `ret_flags` values:

`GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG`:: - True - Credentials were delegated to the remote peer. - False - No credentials were delegated.

`GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG`:: - True - The remote peer has authenticated itself. - False - Remote peer has not authenticated itself.

`GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG`:: - True - replay of protected messages will be detected. - False - replayed messages will not be detected.

`GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG`:: - True - out-of-sequence protected messages will be detected. - False - out-of-sequence messages will not be detected.

`GSS_C_CONF_FLAG`:: - True - Confidentiality service may be invoked by calling gss_wrap routine. - False - No confidentiality service (via gss_wrap) available. gss_wrap will provide message encapsulation, data-origin authentication and integrity services only.

`GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG`:: - True - Integrity service may be invoked by calling either gss_get_mic or gss_wrap routines. - False - Per-message integrity service unavailable.

`GSS_C_ANON_FLAG`:: - True - The initiator's identity has not been revealed, and will not be revealed if any emitted token is passed to the acceptor. - False - The initiator's identity has been or will be authenticated normally.

`GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG`:: - True - Protection services (as specified by the states of the GSS_C_CONF_FLAG and GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) are available for use if the accompanying major status return value is either GSS_S_COMPLETE or GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED. - False - Protection services (as specified by the states of the GSS_C_CONF_FLAG and GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) are available only if the accompanying major status return value is GSS_S_COMPLETE.

`GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG`:: - True - The resultant security context may be transferred to other processes via a call to gss_export_sec_context(). - False - The security context is not transferable.

All other bits should be set to zero.

gss_accept_sec_context ()

OM_uint32   gss_accept_sec_context          (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
                                             const gss_cred_id_t acceptor_cred_handle,
                                             const gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer,
                                             const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
                                             gss_name_t *src_name,
                                             gss_OID *mech_type,
                                             gss_buffer_t output_token,
                                             OM_uint32 *ret_flags,
                                             OM_uint32 *time_rec,
                                             gss_cred_id_t *delegated_cred_handle);

Allows a remotely initiated security context between the application and a remote peer to be established. The routine may return a output_token which should be transferred to the peer application, where the peer application will present it to gss_init_sec_context. If no token need be sent, gss_accept_sec_context will indicate this by setting the length field of the output_token argument to zero. To complete the context establishment, one or more reply tokens may be required from the peer application; if so, gss_accept_sec_context will return a status flag of GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, in which case it should be called again when the reply token is received from the peer application, passing the token to gss_accept_sec_context via the input_token parameters.

Portable applications should be constructed to use the token length and return status to determine whether a token needs to be sent or waited for. Thus a typical portable caller should always invoke gss_accept_sec_context within a loop:

--------------------------------------------------- gss_ctx_id_t context_hdl = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;

do { receive_token_from_peer(input_token); maj_stat = gss_accept_sec_context(&min_stat, &context_hdl, cred_hdl, input_token, input_bindings, &client_name, &mech_type, output_token, &ret_flags, &time_rec, &deleg_cred); if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) { report_error(maj_stat, min_stat); }; if (output_token->length != 0) { send_token_to_peer(output_token);

gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, output_token); }; if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) { if (context_hdl != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, &context_hdl, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); break; }; } while (maj_stat & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); ---------------------------------------------------

Whenever the routine returns a major status that includes the value GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, the context is not fully established and the following restrictions apply to the output parameters:

The value returned via the time_rec parameter is undefined Unless the accompanying ret_flags parameter contains the bit GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG, indicating that per-message services may be applied in advance of a successful completion status, the value returned via the mech_type parameter may be undefined until the routine returns a major status value of GSS_S_COMPLETE.

The values of the GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG, GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG,GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG, GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG, GSS_C_CONF_FLAG,GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG and GSS_C_ANON_FLAG bits returned via the ret_flags parameter should contain the values that the implementation expects would be valid if context establishment were to succeed.

The values of the GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG and GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG bits within ret_flags should indicate the actual state at the time gss_accept_sec_context returns, whether or not the context is fully established.

Although this requires that GSS-API implementations set the GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG in the final ret_flags returned to a caller (i.e. when accompanied by a GSS_S_COMPLETE status code), applications should not rely on this behavior as the flag was not defined in Version 1 of the GSS-API. Instead, applications should be prepared to use per-message services after a successful context establishment, according to the GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG and GSS_C_CONF_FLAG values.

All other bits within the ret_flags argument should be set to zero. While the routine returns GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, the values returned via the ret_flags argument indicate the services that the implementation expects to be available from the established context.

If the initial call of gss_accept_sec_context() fails, the implementation should not create a context object, and should leave the value of the context_handle parameter set to GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT to indicate this. In the event of a failure on a subsequent call, the implementation is permitted to delete the "half-built" security context (in which case it should set the context_handle parameter to GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT), but the preferred behavior is to leave the security context (and the context_handle parameter) untouched for the application to delete (using gss_delete_sec_context).

During context establishment, the informational status bits GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN and GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN indicate fatal errors, and GSS-API mechanisms should always return them in association with a routine error of GSS_S_FAILURE. This requirement for pairing did not exist in version 1 of the GSS-API specification, so applications that wish to run over version 1 implementations must special-case these codes.

The `ret_flags` values:

`GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG`:: - True - Delegated credentials are available via the delegated_cred_handle parameter. - False - No credentials were delegated.

`GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG`:: - True - Remote peer asked for mutual authentication. - False - Remote peer did not ask for mutual authentication.

`GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG`:: - True - replay of protected messages will be detected. - False - replayed messages will not be detected.

`GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG`:: - True - out-of-sequence protected messages will be detected. - False - out-of-sequence messages will not be detected.

`GSS_C_CONF_FLAG`:: - True - Confidentiality service may be invoked by calling the gss_wrap routine. - False - No confidentiality service (via gss_wrap) available. gss_wrap will provide message encapsulation, data-origin authentication and integrity services only.

`GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG`:: - True - Integrity service may be invoked by calling either gss_get_mic or gss_wrap routines. - False - Per-message integrity service unavailable.

`GSS_C_ANON_FLAG`:: - True - The initiator does not wish to be authenticated; the src_name parameter (if requested) contains an anonymous internal name. - False - The initiator has been authenticated normally.

`GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG`:: - True - Protection services (as specified by the states of the GSS_C_CONF_FLAG and GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) are available if the accompanying major status return value is either GSS_S_COMPLETE or GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED. - False - Protection services (as specified by the states of the GSS_C_CONF_FLAG and GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) are available only if the accompanying major status return value is GSS_S_COMPLETE.

`GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG`:: - True - The resultant security context may be transferred to other processes via a call to gss_export_sec_context(). - False - The security context is not transferable.

All other bits should be set to zero.

gss_process_context_token ()

OM_uint32   gss_process_context_token       (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
                                             const gss_buffer_t token_buffer);

Provides a way to pass an asynchronous token to the security service. Most context-level tokens are emitted and processed synchronously by gss_init_sec_context and gss_accept_sec_context, and the application is informed as to whether further tokens are expected by the GSS_C_CONTINUE_NEEDED major status bit. Occasionally, a mechanism may need to emit a context-level token at a point when the peer entity is not expecting a token. For example, the initiator's final call to gss_init_sec_context may emit a token and return a status of GSS_S_COMPLETE, but the acceptor's call to gss_accept_sec_context may fail. The acceptor's mechanism may wish to send a token containing an error indication to the initiator, but the initiator is not expecting a token at this point, believing that the context is fully established. Gss_process_context_token provides a way to pass such a token to the mechanism at any time.

gss_delete_sec_context ()

OM_uint32   gss_delete_sec_context          (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
                                             gss_buffer_t output_token);

Delete a security context. gss_delete_sec_context will delete the local data structures associated with the specified security context, and may generate an output_token, which when passed to the peer gss_process_context_token will instruct it to do likewise. If no token is required by the mechanism, the GSS-API should set the length field of the output_token (if provided) to zero. No further security services may be obtained using the context specified by context_handle.

In addition to deleting established security contexts, gss_delete_sec_context must also be able to delete "half-built" security contexts resulting from an incomplete sequence of gss_init_sec_context()/gss_accept_sec_context() calls.

The output_token parameter is retained for compatibility with version 1 of the GSS-API. It is recommended that both peer applications invoke gss_delete_sec_context passing the value GSS_C_NO_BUFFER for the output_token parameter, indicating that no token is required, and that gss_delete_sec_context should simply delete local context data structures. If the application does pass a valid buffer to gss_delete_sec_context, mechanisms are encouraged to return a zero-length token, indicating that no peer action is necessary, and that no token should be transferred by the application.

gss_context_time ()

OM_uint32   gss_context_time                (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
                                             OM_uint32 *time_rec);

Determines the number of seconds for which the specified context will remain valid.

gss_get_mic ()

OM_uint32   gss_get_mic                     (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
                                             gss_qop_t qop_req,
                                             const gss_buffer_t message_buffer,
                                             gss_buffer_t message_token);

Generates a cryptographic MIC for the supplied message, and places the MIC in a token for transfer to the peer application. The qop_req parameter allows a choice between several cryptographic algorithms, if supported by the chosen mechanism.

Since some application-level protocols may wish to use tokens emitted by gss_wrap() to provide "secure framing", implementations must support derivation of MICs from zero-length messages.

gss_verify_mic ()

OM_uint32   gss_verify_mic                  (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
                                             const gss_buffer_t message_buffer,
                                             const gss_buffer_t token_buffer,
                                             gss_qop_t *qop_state);

Verifies that a cryptographic MIC, contained in the token parameter, fits the supplied message. The qop_state parameter allows a message recipient to determine the strength of protection that was applied to the message.

Since some application-level protocols may wish to use tokens emitted by gss_wrap() to provide "secure framing", implementations must support the calculation and verification of MICs over zero-length messages.

gss_wrap ()

OM_uint32   gss_wrap                        (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
                                             int conf_req_flag,
                                             gss_qop_t qop_req,
                                             const gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer,
                                             int *conf_state,
                                             gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer);

Attaches a cryptographic MIC and optionally encrypts the specified input_message. The output_message contains both the MIC and the message. The qop_req parameter allows a choice between several cryptographic algorithms, if supported by the chosen mechanism.

Since some application-level protocols may wish to use tokens emitted by gss_wrap() to provide "secure framing", implementations must support the wrapping of zero-length messages.

gss_unwrap ()

OM_uint32   gss_unwrap                      (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
                                             const gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer,
                                             gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer,
                                             int *conf_state,
                                             gss_qop_t *qop_state);

Converts a message previously protected by gss_wrap back to a usable form, verifying the embedded MIC. The conf_state parameter indicates whether the message was encrypted; the qop_state parameter indicates the strength of protection that was used to provide the confidentiality and integrity services.

Since some application-level protocols may wish to use tokens emitted by gss_wrap() to provide "secure framing", implementations must support the wrapping and unwrapping of zero-length messages.

gss_display_status ()

OM_uint32   gss_display_status              (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             OM_uint32 status_value,
                                             int status_type,
                                             const gss_OID mech_type,
                                             OM_uint32 *message_context,
                                             gss_buffer_t status_string);

Allows an application to obtain a textual representation of a GSS-API status code, for display to the user or for logging purposes. Since some status values may indicate multiple conditions, applications may need to call gss_display_status multiple times, each call generating a single text string. The message_context parameter is used by gss_display_status to store state information about which error messages have already been extracted from a given status_value; message_context must be initialized to 0 by the application prior to the first call, and gss_display_status will return a non-zero value in this parameter if there are further messages to extract.

The message_context parameter contains all state information required by gss_display_status in order to extract further messages from the status_value; even when a non-zero value is returned in this parameter, the application is not required to call gss_display_status again unless subsequent messages are desired. The following code extracts all messages from a given status code and prints them to stderr:

--------------------------------------------------- OM_uint32 message_context; OM_uint32 status_code; OM_uint32 maj_status; OM_uint32 min_status; gss_buffer_desc status_string;

...

message_context = 0;

do { maj_status = gss_display_status ( &min_status, status_code, GSS_C_GSS_CODE, GSS_C_NO_OID, &message_context, &status_string)

fprintf(stderr, "%.*s\n", (int)status_string.length,

(char *)status_string.value);

gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &status_string);

} while (message_context != 0); ---------------------------------------------------

gss_indicate_mechs ()

OM_uint32   gss_indicate_mechs              (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             gss_OID_set *mech_set);

Allows an application to determine which underlying security mechanisms are available.

gss_compare_name ()

OM_uint32   gss_compare_name                (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             const gss_name_t name1,
                                             const gss_name_t name2,
                                             int *name_equal);

Allows an application to compare two internal-form names to determine whether they refer to the same entity.

If either name presented to gss_compare_name denotes an anonymous principal, the routines should indicate that the two names do not refer to the same identity.

gss_display_name ()

OM_uint32   gss_display_name                (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             const gss_name_t input_name,
                                             gss_buffer_t output_name_buffer,
                                             gss_OID *output_name_type);

Allows an application to obtain a textual representation of an opaque internal-form name for display purposes. The syntax of a printable name is defined by the GSS-API implementation.

If input_name denotes an anonymous principal, the implementation should return the gss_OID value GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS as the output_name_type, and a textual name that is syntactically distinct from all valid supported printable names in output_name_buffer.

If input_name was created by a call to gss_import_name, specifying GSS_C_NO_OID as the name-type, implementations that employ lazy conversion between name types may return GSS_C_NO_OID via the output_name_type parameter.

gss_import_name ()

OM_uint32   gss_import_name                 (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             const gss_buffer_t input_name_buffer,
                                             const gss_OID input_name_type,
                                             gss_name_t *output_name);

Convert a contiguous string name to internal form. In general, the internal name returned (via the output_name parameter) will not be an MN; the exception to this is if the input_name_type indicates that the contiguous string provided via the input_name_buffer parameter is of type GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME, in which case the returned internal name will be an MN for the mechanism that exported the name.

gss_export_name ()

OM_uint32   gss_export_name                 (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             const gss_name_t input_name,
                                             gss_buffer_t exported_name);

To produce a canonical contiguous string representation of a mechanism name (MN), suitable for direct comparison (e.g. with memcmp) for use in authorization functions (e.g. matching entries in an access-control list). The input_name parameter must specify a valid MN (i.e. an internal name generated by gss_accept_sec_context() or by gss_canonicalize_name()).

gss_release_name ()

OM_uint32   gss_release_name                (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             gss_name_t *name);

Free GSSAPI-allocated storage associated with an internal-form name. The name is set to GSS_C_NO_NAME on successful completion of this call.

gss_release_buffer ()

OM_uint32   gss_release_buffer              (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             gss_buffer_t buffer);

Free storage associated with a buffer. The storage must have been allocated by a GSS-API routine. In addition to freeing the associated storage, the routine will zero the length field in the descriptor to which the buffer parameter refers, and implementations are encouraged to additionally set the pointer field in the descriptor to NULL. Any buffer object returned by a GSS-API routine may be passed to gss_release_buffer (even if there is no storage associated with the buffer).

gss_release_oid_set ()

OM_uint32   gss_release_oid_set             (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             gss_OID_set *set);

Free storage associated with a GSSAPI-generated gss_OID_set object. The set parameter must refer to an OID-set that was returned from a GSS-API routine. gss_release_oid_set() will free the storage associated with each individual member OID, the OID set's elements array, and the gss_OID_set_desc.

The gss_OID_set parameter is set to GSS_C_NO_OID_SET on successful completion of this routine.

gss_inquire_cred ()

OM_uint32   gss_inquire_cred                (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             const gss_cred_id_t cred_handle,
                                             gss_name_t *name,
                                             OM_uint32 *lifetime,
                                             gss_cred_usage_t *cred_usage,
                                             gss_OID_set *mechanisms);

Obtains information about a credential.

gss_inquire_context ()

OM_uint32   gss_inquire_context             (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
                                             gss_name_t *src_name,
                                             gss_name_t *targ_name,
                                             OM_uint32 *lifetime_rec,
                                             gss_OID *mech_type,
                                             OM_uint32 *ctx_flags,
                                             int *locally_initiated,
                                             int *open);

Obtains information about a security context. The caller must already have obtained a handle that refers to the context, although the context need not be fully established.

The `ctx_flags` values:

`GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG`:: - True - Credentials were delegated from the initiator to the acceptor. - False - No credentials were delegated.

`GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG`:: - True - The acceptor was authenticated to the initiator. - False - The acceptor did not authenticate itself.

`GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG`:: - True - replay of protected messages will be detected. - False - replayed messages will not be detected.

`GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG`:: - True - out-of-sequence protected messages will be detected. - False - out-of-sequence messages will not be detected.

`GSS_C_CONF_FLAG`:: - True - Confidentiality service may be invoked by calling gss_wrap routine. - False - No confidentiality service (via gss_wrap) available. gss_wrap will provide message encapsulation, data-origin authentication and integrity services only.

`GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG`:: - True - Integrity service may be invoked by calling either gss_get_mic or gss_wrap routines. - False - Per-message integrity service unavailable.

`GSS_C_ANON_FLAG`:: - True - The initiator's identity will not be revealed to the acceptor. The src_name parameter (if requested) contains an anonymous internal name. - False - The initiator has been authenticated normally.

`GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG`:: - True - Protection services (as specified by the states of the GSS_C_CONF_FLAG and GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) are available for use. - False - Protection services (as specified by the states of the GSS_C_CONF_FLAG and GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) are available only if the context is fully established (i.e. if the open parameter is non-zero).

`GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG`:: - True - The resultant security context may be transferred to other processes via a call to gss_export_sec_context(). - False - The security context is not transferable.

gss_wrap_size_limit ()

OM_uint32   gss_wrap_size_limit             (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
                                             int conf_req_flag,
                                             gss_qop_t qop_req,
                                             OM_uint32 req_output_size,
                                             OM_uint32 *max_input_size);

Allows an application to determine the maximum message size that, if presented to gss_wrap with the same conf_req_flag and qop_req parameters, will result in an output token containing no more than req_output_size bytes.

This call is intended for use by applications that communicate over protocols that impose a maximum message size. It enables the application to fragment messages prior to applying protection.

GSS-API implementations are recommended but not required to detect invalid QOP values when gss_wrap_size_limit() is called. This routine guarantees only a maximum message size, not the availability of specific QOP values for message protection.

Successful completion of this call does not guarantee that gss_wrap will be able to protect a message of length max_input_size bytes, since this ability may depend on the availability of system resources at the time that gss_wrap is called. However, if the implementation itself imposes an upper limit on the length of messages that may be processed by gss_wrap, the implementation should not return a value via max_input_bytes that is greater than this length.

gss_add_cred ()

OM_uint32   gss_add_cred                    (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             const gss_cred_id_t input_cred_handle,
                                             const gss_name_t desired_name,
                                             const gss_OID desired_mech,
                                             gss_cred_usage_t cred_usage,
                                             OM_uint32 initiator_time_req,
                                             OM_uint32 acceptor_time_req,
                                             gss_cred_id_t *output_cred_handle,
                                             gss_OID_set *actual_mechs,
                                             OM_uint32 *initiator_time_rec,
                                             OM_uint32 *acceptor_time_rec);

Adds a credential-element to a credential. The credential-element is identified by the name of the principal to which it refers. GSS-API implementations must impose a local access-control policy on callers of this routine to prevent unauthorized callers from acquiring credential-elements to which they are not entitled. This routine is not intended to provide a "login to the network" function, as such a function would involve the creation of new mechanism-specific authentication data, rather than merely acquiring a GSS-API handle to existing data. Such functions, if required, should be defined in implementation-specific extensions to the API.

If desired_name is GSS_C_NO_NAME, the call is interpreted as a request to add a credential element that will invoke default behavior when passed to gss_init_sec_context() (if cred_usage is GSS_C_INITIATE or GSS_C_BOTH) or gss_accept_sec_context() (if cred_usage is GSS_C_ACCEPT or GSS_C_BOTH).

This routine is expected to be used primarily by context acceptors, since implementations are likely to provide mechanism-specific ways of obtaining GSS-API initiator credentials from the system login process. Some implementations may therefore not support the acquisition of GSS_C_INITIATE or GSS_C_BOTH credentials via gss_acquire_cred for any name other than GSS_C_NO_NAME, or a name produced by applying either gss_inquire_cred to a valid credential, or gss_inquire_context to an active context.

If credential acquisition is time-consuming for a mechanism, the mechanism may choose to delay the actual acquisition until the credential is required (e.g. by gss_init_sec_context or gss_accept_sec_context). Such mechanism-specific implementation decisions should be invisible to the calling application; thus a call of gss_inquire_cred immediately following the call of gss_add_cred must return valid credential data, and may therefore incur the overhead of a deferred credential acquisition.

This routine can be used to either compose a new credential containing all credential-elements of the original in addition to the newly-acquire credential-element, or to add the new credential- element to an existing credential. If NULL is specified for the output_cred_handle parameter argument, the new credential-element will be added to the credential identified by input_cred_handle; if a valid pointer is specified for the output_cred_handle parameter, a new credential handle will be created.

If GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL is specified as the input_cred_handle, gss_add_cred will compose a credential (and set the output_cred_handle parameter accordingly) based on default behavior. That is, the call will have the same effect as if the application had first made a call to gss_acquire_cred(), specifying the same usage and passing GSS_C_NO_NAME as the desired_name parameter to obtain an explicit credential handle embodying default behavior, passed this credential handle to gss_add_cred(), and finally called gss_release_cred() on the first credential handle.

If GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL is specified as the input_cred_handle parameter, a non-NULL output_cred_handle must be supplied.

gss_inquire_cred_by_mech ()

OM_uint32   gss_inquire_cred_by_mech        (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             const gss_cred_id_t cred_handle,
                                             const gss_OID mech_type,
                                             gss_name_t *name,
                                             OM_uint32 *initiator_lifetime,
                                             OM_uint32 *acceptor_lifetime,
                                             gss_cred_usage_t *cred_usage);

Obtains per-mechanism information about a credential.

gss_export_sec_context ()

OM_uint32   gss_export_sec_context          (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
                                             gss_buffer_t interprocess_token);

Provided to support the sharing of work between multiple processes. This routine will typically be used by the context-acceptor, in an application where a single process receives incoming connection requests and accepts security contexts over them, then passes the established context to one or more other processes for message exchange. gss_export_sec_context() deactivates the security context for the calling process and creates an interprocess token which, when passed to gss_import_sec_context in another process, will re-activate the context in the second process. Only a single instantiation of a given context may be active at any one time; a subsequent attempt by a context exporter to access the exported security context will fail.

The implementation may constrain the set of processes by which the interprocess token may be imported, either as a function of local security policy, or as a result of implementation decisions. For example, some implementations may constrain contexts to be passed only between processes that run under the same account, or which are part of the same process group.

The interprocess token may contain security-sensitive information (for example cryptographic keys). While mechanisms are encouraged to either avoid placing such sensitive information within interprocess tokens, or to encrypt the token before returning it to the application, in a typical object-library GSS-API implementation this may not be possible. Thus the application must take care to protect the interprocess token, and ensure that any process to which the token is transferred is trustworthy.

If creation of the interprocess token is successful, the implementation shall deallocate all process-wide resources associated with the security context, and set the context_handle to GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT. In the event of an error that makes it impossible to complete the export of the security context, the implementation must not return an interprocess token, and should strive to leave the security context referenced by the context_handle parameter untouched. If this is impossible, it is permissible for the implementation to delete the security context, providing it also sets the context_handle parameter to GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT.

gss_import_sec_context ()

OM_uint32   gss_import_sec_context          (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             const gss_buffer_t interprocess_token,
                                             gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle);

Allows a process to import a security context established by another process. A given interprocess token may be imported only once. See gss_export_sec_context.

gss_create_empty_oid_set ()

OM_uint32   gss_create_empty_oid_set        (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             gss_OID_set *oid_set);

Create an object-identifier set containing no object identifiers, to which members may be subsequently added using the gss_add_oid_set_member() routine. These routines are intended to be used to construct sets of mechanism object identifiers, for input to gss_acquire_cred.

gss_add_oid_set_member ()

OM_uint32   gss_add_oid_set_member          (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             const gss_OID member_oid,
                                             gss_OID_set *oid_set);

Add an Object Identifier to an Object Identifier set. This routine is intended for use in conjunction with gss_create_empty_oid_set when constructing a set of mechanism OIDs for input to gss_acquire_cred. The oid_set parameter must refer to an OID-set that was created by GSS-API (e.g. a set returned by gss_create_empty_oid_set()). GSS-API creates a copy of the member_oid and inserts this copy into the set, expanding the storage allocated to the OID-set's elements array if necessary. The routine may add the new member OID anywhere within the elements array, and implementations should verify that the new member_oid is not already contained within the elements array; if the member_oid is already present, the oid_set should remain unchanged.

gss_test_oid_set_member ()

OM_uint32   gss_test_oid_set_member         (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             const gss_OID member,
                                             const gss_OID_set set,
                                             int *present);

Interrogate an Object Identifier set to determine whether a specified Object Identifier is a member. This routine is intended to be used with OID sets returned by gss_indicate_mechs(), gss_acquire_cred(), and gss_inquire_cred(), but will also work with user-generated sets.

gss_inquire_names_for_mech ()

OM_uint32   gss_inquire_names_for_mech      (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             const gss_OID mechanism,
                                             gss_OID_set *name_types);

Returns the set of nametypes supported by the specified mechanism.

gss_inquire_mechs_for_name ()

OM_uint32   gss_inquire_mechs_for_name      (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             const gss_name_t input_name,
                                             gss_OID_set *mech_types);

Returns the set of mechanisms supported by the GSS-API implementation that may be able to process the specified name.

Each mechanism returned will recognize at least one element within the name. It is permissible for this routine to be implemented within a mechanism-independent GSS-API layer, using the type information contained within the presented name, and based on registration information provided by individual mechanism implementations. This means that the returned mech_types set may indicate that a particular mechanism will understand the name when in fact it would refuse to accept the name as input to gss_canonicalize_name, gss_init_sec_context, gss_acquire_cred or gss_add_cred (due to some property of the specific name, as opposed to the name type). Thus this routine should be used only as a prefilter for a call to a subsequent mechanism-specific routine.

gss_canonicalize_name ()

OM_uint32   gss_canonicalize_name           (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             const gss_name_t input_name,
                                             const gss_OID mech_type,
                                             gss_name_t *output_name);

Generate a canonical mechanism name (MN) from an arbitrary internal name. The mechanism name is the name that would be returned to a context acceptor on successful authentication of a context where the initiator used the input_name in a successful call to gss_acquire_cred, specifying an OID set containing mech_type as its only member, followed by a call to gss_init_sec_context(), specifying mech_type as the authentication mechanism.

gss_duplicate_name ()

OM_uint32   gss_duplicate_name              (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             const gss_name_t src_name,
                                             gss_name_t *dest_name);

Create an exact duplicate of the existing internal name src_name. The new dest_name will be independent of src_name (i.e. src_name and dest_name must both be released, and the release of one shall not affect the validity of the other).

gss_sign ()

OM_uint32   gss_sign                        (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
                                             int qop_req,
                                             gss_buffer_t message_buffer,
                                             gss_buffer_t message_token);

gss_verify ()

OM_uint32   gss_verify                      (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
                                             gss_buffer_t message_buffer,
                                             gss_buffer_t token_buffer,
                                             int *qop_state);

gss_seal ()

OM_uint32   gss_seal                        (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
                                             int conf_req_flag,
                                             int qop_req,
                                             gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer,
                                             int *conf_state,
                                             gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer);

gss_unseal ()

OM_uint32   gss_unseal                      (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                             gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
                                             gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer,
                                             gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer,
                                             int *conf_state,
                                             int *qop_state);